To have one ethnic minority erupt in angry rioting looks like misfortune. To have two erupt in angry rioting suggests that a rethink of the overall approach might be a good idea. Urumqi has been in chaos for the last 72 hours, and reports suggest that at least for the moment things are not improving. Considering all the obsessive attention paid to ensuring that the 20th anniversary of TAM in Beijing went smoothly, it is perhaps not surprising that the latest terrible incident in China should once again flare up at the country's faraway margins.

Two divergent narratives now seem to be unfolding. The best place to see an evolving digest of Chinese and Western coverage in one place is at EastSouthWestNorth. However, to summarize, in the broad Western media narrative, Uighurs ground down by decades of colonial oppression and incited by racism have erupted in rebellion. In the one told by Chinese media, "splittists" let by the Uighur exile Rebiyah Kadeer have engineered an outbreak of groundless violence (中) directed largely at innocent ethnic Han.

Condensing as they must a long and complicated history from different political points of view, both narratives are hobbled. The Western narrative is hobbled by a reflexive sympathy for any group arrayed in opposition to a Chinese state that is well established in the role of bogeyman (although it's worth reading Adam Minter's post contrasting the New York Times' Tibetan "protestors" of 2008 with the Uighur "rioters" of 2009). The Chinese narrative is hobbled by a national myth-making apparatus that allows no room whatsoever for the acnowledgment of Uighur grievances.

In the Tibetan riots of 2008 and many of the other controversial events surrounding the Olympics, the gulf between the Chinese and Western narratives lead to a great deal of tension between Chinese people and the western media (largely represented by CNN, which received death threats at its bureau in Beijing). Perhaps in attempt to substantiate its own narrative on this occasion, the Chinese authorities were surprisingly quick to release casualty figures and to bring foreign media to the site of the unrest. However, with the presence of foreign media possibly having encouraged at least one mob, and with Han Chinese "revenge mobs" reportedly taking up arms, it remains to be seen whether Urumqi remains open for long. Chengdu was quite open following the earthquake of May, 2008, but bad habits were in evidence again during recent foreign media attempts to report on the first anniversary, so the trend is mixed at best. The Foreign Correspondents Club of China is already receiving reports of detention of foreign journalists in Urumqi.

The Chinese government's approach to communication in this case draws from a playbook that will be familiar to anyone who followed the Tibetan rioting last year. Evil external forces are directly indicted. Graphic images of rampaging minorities and bloody Han predominate. Horror is expressed by a mix of victimized Han and the ethnic group involved. There are elements of truth in this narrative that should be respected. Innocent Han who committed no crime other than living in Urumqi are being attacked. There are no doubt Uighurs who are completely horrified by the rioting, and who were injured in the riots. It's possible that Ms. Kadeer's World Uighur Congress encouraged at least a demonstration even if not actual rioting, especially considering the recent unfortunate attack on Uighur laborers in south China. There are almost certainly "terrorists" in Xinjiang.

But the  missing from this official story, as it was missing from official reports on the Tibetan riots, is any acknowledgment that Uighurs in general might have legitimate grievances. Grievances about the influx of ethnic Han, the relative lack of economic opportunity, demolition of their traditional cities, limitations on their right to freely practice their religion, or whatever.

That's a serious omission because, while it is made with an eye on propagating an official story of the spread of development and prosperity, it comes with a long-term price: it inflames the very tensions it attempts to paper over. And it, with marvelous efficiency, it inflames them on both sides. Uighurs are given the impression that their concerns are considered unworthy of acknowledgment by the State, a situation that is a classic recipe for convincing people to take extreme measures. Other Chinese, meanwhile, are deprived of any context for the riots, which feeds into a colonial attitude toward Uighurs that I have experienced firsthand. If you believe that you have given a people nothing but development and progress and economic opportunity, and they rise up against you, then you will come to see them as at best treacherous and untrustworthy and at worst as less than human, with predictable consequences. Legitimate grievances or not, the riots are almost certainly doing terrible damage to the Uighur cause in China.

Obviously, acknowledging Uighur grievances, especially during the rioting itself, isn't a recipe for immediate peace. It's only part of a long-term solution. But the omission, especially as part of a pattern of such omissions, is telling. And there will be a price to be paid for it, because if you can't acknowledge that there are problems and therefore take visible steps to address them, the only viable alternative is to clamp down ever tighter. And that, as history has shown, is a virtual guarantee of future troubles to come.

Previously on Imagethief:

Tibet and the trouble with unassailable national myths (March, 2008)

Further reading:

Urumqi, May 2006

Urumqi, May 2006. Photograph by the author.